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HYDE: EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS
EDWARD E. HOLLOWELL*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in
H;'de t' Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2' that a public hospital
which had entered into an exclusive contract with a medical corpora-
tion to provide anesthesia services at the hospital was in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Hyde decision stands in stark con-
trast to decisions throughout the country which have consistently up-
held the right of a hospital to enter into an exclusive contract with
physicians for providing certain medical services at the hospital.2
Exclusive contracts are common in the hospital-based specialties of'
anesthesiology and pathology. Courts have recognized the value of ex-
clusive contracts in promoting better patient care by. for example. pro-
viding continuous availability of professional services,3 promoting
better and more uniform standards by the technicians.' and reducing
scheduling problems.5 However, a practitioner who is not a member of
the group with whom the hospital has entered into an exclusive con-
tract is barred from practicing his specialty at the hospital. It is well-
settled that a physician does not have an unqualified right to practice
his profession in a public hospital.' but a hospital cannot exclude a
physician or surgeon from practice therein by rules, regulations or acts
of' the hospital's governing authorities which are unreasonable or
discriminatory.
Exclusive contracts have been subjected to numerous attacks by
Partner in the firm of llollowell & Silverstein. Raleigh. N C
I 6X6 1:2d 2X6 5th Car 19921. cert.granted. 103S. Ca. 1271 (1983).
2 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ilarron v. United ltosp. Center. Inc. 522 I- 2d
1133 14th Cir. 1975) tper curim). cert. denied. 424 U.S. 916 (1976). labelled a Sherman .Act chal-
lenge to an exclusive radiology contract "frivolous- and affirmed the conclusion of a lower court
that an exclusive anesthesiology contract was reasonable and justified. See al.r, Capita v.Shott.
62(1 F.2d 438 14th Cir. 1980). afg. 487 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.W. Va. 1978). The Sevcnth ('rcuit
Court of Appeals vacated a district court preliminary injunction against enforcement of in cxclu-
save anesthesiology contract in Dos Santos v. Columbus.-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center. 684 F2d
1346 (7th Cir. 1982).
3. Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Ilosp. Center. 234 Cal. App. 2d 377. 44 Cal Rptr. 572
(1965)
4. BenclI v. City of Virginia. 258 Minn. 559. 104 N.W.2d 33 (1960).
5. Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n. of Western Pennsylvania. 453 Pa. 60. 311 A.2d 634
(1973). cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
6. layman v. City of Galveston. 273 U.S. 414 11927).
7 .See Paine v. Brunswick County Hosp. Auth.. 470 F. Supp. 28 (E.D.N C 1978).
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practitioners who are prohibited from practicing their specialties in
hospitals because the hospital has entered into an exclusive contract
with another practitioner or group for the provision of those services.
Exclusive contracts have withstood attacks based on procedural due
process,' the physician's right to treat his patient and the patient's right
to select his physician. ' illegal corporate practice of medicine,"' unlaw-
ful interference with the right of the physician to practice medicine."
and violation of civil rights. 2 Exclusive contracts have been increas-
ingly subjected to challenges on another front: they restrain trade and
competition in violation of the antitrust laws. With the exception of the
Hrde case, however, the hospital's decision to contract exclusively has
been uniformly upheld by the courts against antitrust attacks.
In Hyde an anesthesiologist applied for anesthesia privileges at East
Jefferson General Hospital in Metairie. Louisiana. His application was
recommended favorably by both the credentials and the executive com-
mittees of the medical staff. The hospital board, however, voted to
deny his application on the ground that the hospital had an exclusive
contract with an anesthesia group. The physician brought suit in fed-
eral district court after he learned that his application had been denied.
His complaint alleged, among other things. that the hospital's exclusive
contract was violative of antitrust laws and that the district court
should order the hospital to appoint him to its medical staff. The dis-
trict court dismissed the physician's claim.' 3 but that decision was re-
versed on appeal."4
PER SE v. RULE OF REASON
The Sherman Antitrust Act is the antitrust statute that is most rele-
vant to the issues of medical staff membership and clinical privileges.' 5
8 Adler. 453 Pa. 60. 311 A.2d 034 (1973).
9. Benteli. 238 Mlinn. 559. 104 N.W.2d 633 (1960).
10 Rush v. City of St. Petersburg. 205 So.2d I I (Fla. Dist Ci. App. 1967): Centeno v Rose-
' tle Community llosp.. 107 Cal. App 3d 62. 167 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979).
II. Letsch v. Northern San Diego County |losp. Dist.. 246 Cal. App. 2d 673. 55 Cal. Rptr.
11811 967).
12. C(apuh. 620 F. 2 d 438 (4th Cir. 19K0).
13. ilydc v. Jefferson Parish ltospital )istnct No 2.513 F. Supp. 532 (i.D. La. 1981). |losp.
)it No. 2.513 F. Supp. 532 (E.). La. 1981). res'd. 686 F 2d 286 (5th Cir. 19 821.c'-t. granted. 103
S. Ct. 1271 1983)
14. i/ride. 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) The Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 id. §§ 41-58 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). may apply to some anti-competitive behavior involving medical stair membership
and clinical privileges: however, the FTC has no jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations. Thi;'
maN limit its ability to bring antitrust complaints against nonprofit hospitals. Id. § 44 (1976). :At
.ree American Medical Ass'n v. FTC. 638 F.2d 443. 448 (1980). aqJ'd. 102 S. Ci. 1744.relh, denied.
102 S. Ct. 2048 (1982) (business aspects of the American Medical Association fall within the scope
of the FTC Act even if they are secondary to the chantable and social aspects of their work). The
other federal antitrust law.s, the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-18 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). and the
2
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Section 1 of the Act prohibits any -contract. combination. . . or con-
spiracy" that constitutes a "restraint of trade or commerce.""e€ Section
2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and combinations
or conspiracies to monopolize trade or commerce.' Over the years.
courts have determined that certain types of restraint of trade are viola-
tive of antitrust in and of themselves (*perse") and there is no necessity
for weighing the restraint on trade against the benefits to competition
and the public (-rule of reason"). The court held in Hide that the
exclusive contract was an unlawful "tying arrangement" which is aper
se violation of the Sherman Act. A tying arrangement is an agreement
by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchases a different product. In this case, the court stated that the
users of the hospital's operating room (the tying product) are also com-
pelled to purchase the hospital's chosen anesthesia service (the tied
product). The court stated that these are two distinct services which a
buyer should be able to obtain separately. Such tying arrangements are
per .se violations of the antitrust laws. but only if the following condi-
tions exist:
I. There are two separate products. the tying product and the tied
product:
2. There is a sufficient market power in the tying market to coerce
purchase of the tied product:
3. There is involvement of a not insubstantial am~ount of interstate
commerce in the tied market:
4. There arc anti-competitive effects in the tied market.
SUFFICII-NT MARKLT POWER
The definition of "'relevant market" is critical to the determination of
whether or not there is sufficient market power in the tying market to
coerce purchase of the tied product. The evidence showed that only
thirty percent of the patients from the immediate locale of the hospital
utilized that hospitals services, and the district court therefore defined
the relevant market as the greater metropolitan New Orleans area.
Since there were twenty other hospitals in that area to which surgeons
could admit their patients and patients could choose if they were at all
dissatisfied with the anesthesia service offered at the defendant hospi-
tal. the district court held that the exclusive contract affecting only one
hospital out of twenty in the area did not cause anti-competitive effects
in the market and did not show that the hospital had sufficient market
Robainon-Patman Act. id § 13 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). deAl with spccitic kinds of anti-comptjtic
behavior that arc not likely to arise in medical staff membership and clinical privilege! cases.
16. 15 U.S C. § I (1976.
17 Id §2
3
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power in the anesthesia market to coerce purchase of the anesthesia
services.
In determining the relevant geographic market, the court of appeals
stated that. since patients usually select their hospitals based more on
location than on price or quality, the immediate geographical area the
hospital serves should be the relevant market area considered. In addi-
tion. the court stated that, to show an antitrust violation in cases involv-
ing the health care industry, market domination was not required and
only a showing of appreciable restraint on free competition within the
immediate geographical area was necessary. The court reasoned that
the health care industry does not function as a competitive market in
the same sense as other industries to which the traditional economic
analysis is applied. It noted that several market imperfections in the
health care industry favor public, nonprofit entities like the defendant
hospital. It found that the prevalence of third-party payment of bills
and the lack of complete information regarding the quality of medical
care prevents patients from realistically comparing the quality or the
co.st of medical care of hospitals. The court reasoned from these obser-
vations that the patient would be more likely to purchase his medical
care from a nonprofit entity that has no apparent profit motive to cut
quality. In an apparent non sequilur. it then stated that these factors
lead patients to select the hospital closest to home and concluded that
the relevant market for the defendant hospital was the immediate lo-
cale of the hospital. It found anti-competitive effects of the exclusive
contract in this market because the patients and the surgeons who prac-
tice at the defendant hospital have no choice of anesthesiologists other
than the hospital's chosen group. The court stated that this prohibition
of competition reduces the incentive for improving or initiating new
techniques or procedures.
BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION
Business justifications excuse restraints unless there is a less restric-
tive way to accomplish the end which the business justifications purport
to serve. The court rejected the hospital's argument that the exclusive
contract was justified by concerns for quality patient care. The court
noted that the hospital realized a certain amount of financial profit out
of the arrangement and asserted that a profit was "actual basis" for the
hospital's decision to enter into the exclusive contract. The court,
therefore. declared the exclusive contract illegal and granted the plain-
till's request for an injunction to permit him to practice at the hospital.
Dos S.,'''oS
Just one month before the Fifth Circuit decision in Ivj'de. the Sev-
4
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enth Circuit indicated in dicta that an exclusive contract for anesthesia
services at a hospital did not violate the antitrust laws. In Dos S'antos r.
Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center'" an anesthesiologist brought
suit challenging, under antitrust laws, an exclusive contract for provi-
sion of anesthesia services at a hospital. The lower court granted a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the exclusive con-
tract, but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the legal requirements for a preliminary
injunction had not been met. i.e., there was no showing of irreparable
harm, the preliminary injunction was not in the public interest, and the
harm to the defendant hospital would be greater than the harm to the
plaintiff anesthesiologist.
The court indicated that, on remand, the case must be analzcd
under the 'rule of reason" because the court viewed the combination a.
vertical. A vertical combination is one between, for example. a manu-
facturer and a supplier, as opposed to a horizontal combination, which
would be between providers of the same product who are competitor.
Applying this definition to the case. the exclusive contract was vertical
because it was between the hospital -seller" and the anesthesiolog,
group which supplied one of the products which the hospital sold--
anesthesiology services. Vertical combinations are notper.e violations
of antitrust laws: rather, they are subject to the rule of reason analysis.
In addition, the court's definition of the relevant market in Dos Set//-
ios was distinct from that in Hyde. The district court in Dos San. s
apparently found that the geographical market was limited to the hos-
pital. By limiting the market to the hospital, the exclusive contract
gave the anesthesia group a monopoly in the market, leaving the group
free to set the prices and determine the quality of services without com-
petitive pressures. In rejecting this theory. the Seventh Circuit Court of'
Appeals indicated that the hospital was the real purchaser of the anes-
thesia services and not the patient because the patient generally take.,
no part in the selection of a particular anesthesiologist and because the
expense of anesthesia services to the patient is ordinarily at least par-
tially insured or otherwise payable by a third-party. Therefore. the pa-
tient in these circumstances receives the service but does so without
making any significant economic decision. It may thus be more appro-
priate for antitrust purposes to treat the hospital as the purchaser in
view of the hospital's responsibility for assuring the availability of an-
esthesia services for its patients, its incentive to maximize the use of its
surgical facilities and its potential liability for negligent rendition of
anesthesia services in its operating room. If the hospital rather than the
individual patient is regarded as a purchaser. the relevant market could
18. 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cr 1982)
5
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be defined as the area in which the anesthesia group operates and in
which the hospital can practicably turn for alternative provision of an-
esthesia services.
The Seventh Circuit in Dos Sanos cited with approval the district
court decision in HIde concerning the pro-competitive effects of exclu-
sive contracts. The district court in Hyde had concluded that, if any-
thing, exclusive contracts may have a positive effect on competition.
A closed department may enhance competition among the hospitals in
the market by increasing the quality of medical care available. It may
also serve to benefit competition among anesthesiology groups if the
terms of the exclusive contract are not for unreasonable periods of time.
Such a system would serve to encourage anesthesiologists to improve
the quality of their services in order to obtain contracts with hospitals."'
HYDE iN THE SUPREME COURT
The grant of certiorari in the Iide case20 provides an opportunity to
bring the law in the Fifth Circuit into line with other decisions. Even if
the Supreme Court should affirm the finding of an unlawful tying ar-
rangement. however, its holding would probably leave a hospital free
to use an exclusive contract as long as it did not itself have a share in
the profits of the contracting physician group. Nevertheless, a decision
based on such a rationale would call into question the vertical integra-
tion of other services within hospitals. Only the relatively arbitrary line
distinguishing a single complex service from the offering of discrete
services might then stand between an institution and a finding of an
illegal tie-in. The problem with the Hide case is precisely that many
ancillary technical, medical, and even housekeeping services provided
by hospitals might be treated as tied products. thus subjecting the hos-
pital to per.se condemnation in a suit brought by an alternative pro-
vider demanding access to the hospital's patients.
When the Dos Sanios court suggested that the hospital, rather than
the patient. should be regarded for antitrust purposes as the purchaser
of anesthesia services, it was addressing the relevant market issue and
was not considering the appropriateness of applying tying theory in the
hospital setting. Nonetheless, its reasoning may be applicable to the
question whether, in the case of an exclusive arrangement. there are in
fact two products that should be separately obtainable. If the hospital
itself is to be considered a buyer of anesthesia services, then perhaps
the patient should not be regarded as a buyer entitled to purchase oper-
ating room services and anesthesia services separately. In addition to
being theoretically attractive, the view that the hospital is accountable
19 513 F Supp 532. 541 (E.D La. 19NI).
20 The Supreme Coun has granted ccnirra in the Il'de cae 103 S Ct. 1271 (1983)
6
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to patients in the competitive market for procuring the various inputs
that together constitute hospital care increasingly accords with market-
place realities. Competition among anesthesiologists is likely to be
more intense when the hospital is the buyer.
The best way to resolve the antitrust status of exclusive contracts
would probably be to employ the principles developed in other exclu-
sive-dealing cases rather than the more restrictive rule applicable to
tying. As the Federal Trade Commission has suggested in its amicus
brief in H'de.2' the test should focus on the aggregate share of the mar-
ket for anesthesia services foreclosed, the duration of the contracts, and
the efficiency considerations and business circumstances that led to the
particular arrangement. Viewed in this light, the concern is with the
foreclosure of other anesthesiologists and with competition in the mar-
ket in which hospitals contract for their services. Presumably this mar-
ket will be larger than that in which patients shop for surgery. It seems
likely that few violations would be found under such an analysis.
The courts should begin to recognize that tie-ins that are burden-
some to consumers can be extracted only if the seller sacrifices some of
his potential monopoly return on the tying product in order to induce
acceptance of the tie-in. Thus. it is seldom in a seller's interest to use a
tying arrangement to sell a second product or service that a purchaser
would prefer not to have. Only if the purchaser is indifferent will the
tie-in be costless to the seller. and. if it is also costless to the purchaser.
it is not clear what purpose the antitrust laws serve in prohibiting the
arrangement. It is possible that the Supreme Court's decision in the
Ih'de case will indicate whether antitrust law in the current era is in-
tended to promote fairness and equal opportunity for competitors such
as Hyde himself or is instead predominantly concerned with consumer
welfare. If the latter object is deemed paramount. the Court should
approve hospitals' use of exclusive contracts.
2! The Jutte D)epinmnit h% alm, filed an amicus brief taking a similar ix.ition The
I. (% c%%% d um%.c cuntracts Also appear in an advisory opinion. Letiter to Robert L Nord.
Lq. In re. Burnham Ilo,,p. Feb 24. IY83
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